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NOTES ON THE NEUTERED MOTHER, OR TOWARD A
QUEER SOCIALIST MATRIARCHY
Teemu Ruskola∗
This tribute to Martha Fineman focuses on a key work that, to me, occupies
one of the highest points in the intellectual arc of her career, namely her
pathbreaking 1995 book, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and Other
Twentieth Century Tragedies. Below, I read it from the perspective of queer
theory.1 I first consider its unqualified demand for the abolition of marriage, and
then turn to its commitment to refocusing family law on the figure of the
Mother—a predecessor of the vulnerable subject, a theoretical construct that has
come to dominate Fineman’s more recent work.2
Before proceeding, let me comment briefly on Martha Fineman’s status as a
theorist—a qualification that is necessary, in the first place, even to consider her
status as a queer theorist. In The Neutered Mother, Fineman builds her argument
from an examination of law, history, and politics, yet the book soars far above
and beyond the usual policy prescriptions that accompany works of legal
scholarship. To be sure, her call for the abolition of marriage, for example, could
be considered a policy recommendation. Yet Fineman is not naïve: she knows
that the idea has zero likelihood of success in the current political climate.
Significantly, though, she believes that envisioning what the world would look
like sans state-sanctioned marriage is a vitally important intellectual project. She
states the task of what she calls “utopian theory” with characteristic simplicity
and clarity:
The production of practical suggestions is not the only justification for
theory . . . . Sometimes re-visioning, even if utopian, is valuable
simply because it forces us to look at old relationships in new lights
and thereby understand some things about how we perceive the natural
or normal, as well as how we create the deviant.3

∗
Jonas Robitscher Professor of Law, Emory Law School. I want to thank the editors, David L. Eng, and
Debbie Dinner for their comments on this Essay.
1
For Fineman’s personal effort to stage a conversation between queer theory and feminist legal theory,
see Martha Albertson Fineman, Introduction: Feminist and Queer Legal Theory, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL
THEORY: INTIMATE ENCOUNTERS, UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATIONS 1–6 (Martha Fineman et al. eds., 2009).
2
See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human
Condition, 20 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008).
3
MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 232 (1995).
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Methodologically, Fineman’s The Neutered Mother and queer theory share a
commitment to utopian theorizing and the deconstruction of norms.4
I.

ABOLITION OF MARRIAGE, OR QUEER SOCIALISM?

The most obvious way to read The Neutered Mother as a contribution to
queer theory is to focus on its unequivocal and unqualified call for the abolition
of marriage—a cause once embraced by queer politics, albeit in the last
millennium.5 Although she does not state her case in quite these terms, Fineman
objects to marriage essentially as a form of state-sponsored discrimination
against single people—an institutionalized social structure that delivers
ideological and material subsidies, through law and culture, to men and women
who choose to marry.6
More specifically, Fineman objects to the fact that the privileged status of
our contemporary conception of marriage is premised on the notion that
romantic sexual affiliation between a man and a woman provides the essential
foundation for family. She aptly calls this notion “the sexual family,” an
understanding that excludes other forms of intimacy as less deserving of state
protection and support.7 (After Obergefell v. Hodges, the right to marry has of
course been extended to same-sex couples, but that has not altered the basic logic
of marriage as a privileged sexual coupling.8) Although Fineman’s critique of
the sexual family might be read as anti-sex—or at least not affirmatively “sexpositive”—her position is very clear.9 By telling the state to get out of the
business of marriage, Fineman wants to level the playing field for all manner of
sexual affiliations, regardless of the gender or the number of parties, for
example, that such arrangements may entail. As she observes emphatically, in a
post-marriage world all voluntary adult sexual interactions “would be
permitted—nothing prohibited, nothing privileged.”10 Fineman’s argument

4
Cf. JOSÉ ESTEBAN MUÑOZ, CRUISING UTOPIA: THE THEN AND THERE OF QUEER FUTURITY (2009);
MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE (1999).
5
See, for example, WARNER, supra note 4, at 88–89, for a discussion of queer critiques of marriage.
6
See FINEMAN, supra note 3, at 226–27.
7
See id. at 1–2.
8
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015).
9
Cf. Katherine Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Law, Feminism, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
181, 203 (2001) (“The dependency or danger stance taken by most legal feminists when it comes to questions
of sexuality is a testament to the persuasive power of the structural materialism of theorists such as Catherine
Mackinnon and Martha Fineman.”). For an emphatic endorsement of The Neutered Mother as a vital text for
sexual minorities, see Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Lesbians and Gay Men Should Read Martha Fineman, 8 AM. U.
J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 167, 172–74 (2000).
10
FINEMAN, supra note 3, at 229–30.
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against marriage and the sexual family it grounds is, in short, anti-state—not
anti-sex. In fact, it is explicitly in favor of sex and its deregulation: to liberate
sex, we must untie it from wedlock. “Instead, the interactions of female and male
sexual affiliates would be governed by the same rules that regulate other
interactions in our society—specifically those of contract and property, as well
as tort and criminal law.”11 This opens the door to an extraordinarily wide range
of sexual, as well as non-sexual, intimacies. Indeed, in considering the
parameters of “alternative” families, the introduction to The Neutered Mother
asks pointedly, “Is it even necessary to have more than one person for the label
to apply?”12
That Fineman’s call for the deregulation of sexual intimacies comes with no
qualifications—with the exception of being limited to consenting adults—makes
it queer indeed, freeing the social space to be occupied by “families we choose,”
to borrow the title of Kath Weston’s pathbreaking ethnography of queer
kinship.13 Indeed, these families can range anywhere from a single person to
plural sexual groupings to non-sexual intimacies. Recalling this argument some
two decades later is poignant. Whatever might have been queer about gay
politics in 1995 or earlier has all but disappeared. A movement launched in the
Stonewall era in the name of gay liberation has been transformed beyond
recognition. Instead of seeking freedom, at some point the movement made a
decisive turn toward equality, with “sexual liberation” turning into “marriage
equality.”14 Rather than seeking to reimagine society, the movement took up the
fight for the right to join the military and to get married, thereby assimilating
into two of the most conservative institutions in society.
Same-sex marriage is undoubtedly an important achievement in terms of
equality, given the numerous privileges it affords to couples who qualify.
However, although equality is not a meaningless value, it is a limited one.
Whatever else matrimony means, it emphatically does not signify sexual
liberation. The AIDS crisis, which fueled queer rage and propelled utopian
longing for radical futures in the 1980s and 1990s, gave way to long-term drug
treatments, increased social acceptance of homosexuality, and neoliberalism.
Same-sex marriage in turn is the political offspring of the perfect union of the
sexual family and neoliberalism. The former is founded on a sexual contract,
11

Id. at 229.
Id. at 4.
13
KATH WESTON, FAMILIES WE CHOOSE: LESBIANS, GAYS, KINSHIP (1991).
14
It is no accident that the logo of the Human Rights Campaign (the leading LGBT rights organization
in the United States), unveiled in 1995, is an equal sign. See Our Logo, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.
hrc.org/hrc-story/about-our-logo (last visited Apr. 8, 2018).
12
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while the latter finds no value higher than the pursuit of the satisfaction of private
desire. From these premises, same-sex marriage follows as a matter of logic.
To be sure, this logic is more political than analytic. It may well be that
marriage looms so large in our political imagination that it is a right “we cannot
not want.”15 However, it is significant that equality is ultimately an abstract
value. The formal condition of “marriage equality” can be achieved through two
diametrically opposed strategies: by opening marriage to all, or by abolishing it
for everyone. In fact, marriage is by definition an exclusive institution, and it
remains so even after same-sex marriage gained legal recognition. Its most
notable continuing exclusions are based on the number of spouses and rules of
consanguinity—there is no “marriage equality” for polygamists or incestuous
couples. Abolition of marriage, in contrast, would result in instant and perfect
equality for everyone: no marriage for anyone. Nevertheless, although the formal
logic of equality would thus seem to favor abolition, as a political goal “marriage
equality” emphatically did not come to refer to the end of marriage, but to its
expansion. The sexual family remains an ongoing, even intensifying, twentyfirst century tragedy. With the assimilationist politics of homonormativity, we
now witness the emergence of “the neutered queer.”16
Insofar as marriage is concerned, then, Martha Fineman is, and was back in
1995, far more queer than LGBTQ politics is today. However, although The
Neutered Mother has revolutionary implications for the organization of sexual
relations, spelling out those implications is not Fineman’s ultimate concern in
the book. In her analysis, while sexual intimacy constitutes the primary
ideological foundation for our conception of marriage, the sexual family that it
underwrites is not just the home of sex. It is also one of the primary welfare
institutions in society, one that provides a stunning amount of mostly invisible,
largely gendered, and essentially unremunerated care, from household labor to
caring for the young, the ill, and the old (to name just a few of the most obvious
categories).17 Rather than detailing the outlines for sexual freedom in a utopian
world that has de-linked sex from marriage, Fineman’s main focus in The
Neutered Mother is to consider how relations of dependency ought to be
organized when they are no longer housed inside the institution of marriage.

15
See Teemu Ruskola, Gay Rights Versus Queer Theory: What’s Left of Sodomy After Lawrence v.
Texas?, SOC. TEXT, Fall–Winter 2005, at 235, 244 (analyzing Gayatri Spivak’s characterization of rights).
16
I borrow this term from Mel Chen. See MEL Y. CHEN, ANIMACIES: BIOPOLITICS, RACIAL MATTERING,
AND QUEER AFFECT 66 (2012).
17
FINEMAN, supra note 3, at 205, 234–35.
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Does this predominant focus on the material conditions of intimacies make
her approach less “queer” than her call for the abolition of marriage? Whether
an analysis of economic and social dependency among intimates whose
relationships may or may not be sexual in nature qualifies as a proper subject
matter of queer theory is a methodological question with no single answer. Some
may wish to define queer theory by what it investigates, limiting its scope to
queer sexual subjects. Others—I count myself among them—may prefer to
identify queer theory by its method, rather than by the sexual identities of the
subjects it investigates. From this perspective, anyone or anything can be the
subject or object of a queer investigation, depending on one’s approach.18 On
this view, Fineman’s analysis of relations of dependency beyond marriage need
not qualify as any less queer than her critique of marriage and the narrowly
defined sexual family.
Indeed, the implications of the de-legalization of marriage for relations of
dependence among non-sexual intimates are no less revolutionary than its
consequences for sexual relations. Fineman calls for the state to provide support
to all caretakers who are looking after intimates, whoever those intimates may
be—lovers, ex-lovers, children, parents, grandparents, aunts and uncles, friends,
neighbors, or anyone else.19 We might even consider this a kind of “queer
socialism.” Unlike more state-centered twentieth-century socialisms, it does not
make the state directly responsible for those who cannot take care of themselves.
Rather, it recognizes a value in allowing intimates—various kinds of alternative
“families”—to carry out this care while giving them the right to claim support
from the state. This is a radical and, in my view, certainly “queer enough” vision
of social organization.
II. NURTURING FATHERS, OR QUEERING THE LAW OF THE MOTHER?
But there is more to Fineman’s analysis beyond liberating sex from
marriage. As far as non-sexual intimacies are concerned, she has a specific
focus. While Fineman’s utopian vision suggests that even a single woman can
constitute a family on her own—one no less worthy of social and political
recognition than any other—the paradigmatic single woman in The Neutered
Mother is in fact a single woman with a child: a mother. This makes sense insofar
as Fineman wants us to focus on the economic, social, cultural, and political
conditions that structure relations of dependency. There is no question that single
18
I elaborate on the distinction between definitions of queer theory based on subject matter versus method
in an earlier work. Teemu Ruskola, Raping Like a State, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1477, 1481 (2010).
19
See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 3, at 234–35.
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mothers perform more than their fair share of unremunerated caretaking labor in
society.
Yet Fineman’s figure of the Mother—with a capital “M”—is not simply one
particular instance illustrating a more universal phenomenon of dependence (or
what Fineman calls “inevitable dependency,” which in turn gives rise to
“derivative dependency” as caretakers of dependents become in turn dependent
on others to perform their caretaking roles).20 For Fineman, what she calls “the
Mother/Child dyad” is exemplary. Although she recognizes that it does not
exhaust the universe of dependent relations among intimates, nonetheless she
sees this vertical “natural” relationship as the paradigmatic alternative to the
horizontally oriented sexual affiliation that defines marriage and the sexual
family for which it provides the foundation.21
Fineman’s commitment to the Mother–Child pair may give pause to a queer
reader. Queer theory is a heterogeneous field but if there is anything that unites
it, it is an extreme reluctance—even axiomatic refusal—to make gendered
distinctions. Whatever else it is, the image of a Mother–Child pairing is a highly
gendered vision. Nonetheless, Fineman espouses it unapologetically—“even
defiantly,” in her own words.22 She does not believe in the utility of genderneutral laws in a world that still operates on the basis of gendered social norms.
If labor markets pay men more than women, formal parental equality means that
mothers are more likely to be caring for children at home than fathers are, and
therefore less likely to be compensated for their contributions to the reproduction
of social and cultural values.23
However, Fineman’s commitment to motherhood is not grounded only in
sociological or economic fact. It is ultimately epistemological. Although she is
evidently keen to attend to “real” mothers’ needs, in her usage “Mother” does
not refer only to women who are in fact mothers: “I realize there are mothers
who abuse, neglect, and abandon children. I realize that there are women who
do not want to mother and men who do,” she states forthrightly.24 Ultimately,
she offers Mother as a metaphor, a symbol indexing an ethical ideal.25 What
motivates her is the demeaned status of Mother in legal and cultural discourses.
She observes that in the fields of psychoanalysis, anthropology, and policy

20
21
22
23
24
25

Id. at 8.
See id. at 5.
Id. at 234.
Id. at 37–38.
Id. at 234.
See id. at 234–35.
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making (among others), motherhood is a “colonized category”: all manner of
social, psychological, and cultural ills are routinely attributed to bad, inadequate,
and deviant mothers.26 Fineman’s mission is to de-colonize motherhood as a
concept, to “re-claim” it as a symbol for an “ethical practice” that “embod[ies]
an ideal of social ‘goodness.’”27
Ethically appealing as this may be, it does bear the risk of invoking
essentialist stereotypes of cultural feminism. Paradoxically, however, it is
precisely because Mother is a gendered symbol that it has potentially unsettling
implications for how we think about both parenting and dependency. In
Fineman’s view, men, too, “can and should be Mothers.”28 “In fact, if men are
interested in acquiring legal rights of access to children (or other dependents),”
she maintains that “they must be Mothers in the stereotypical nurturing sense of
that term—that is, engaged in caretaking.”29 In this vision, a father, properly
construed, is a male Mother. The transfiguration of the gender-neutral notion of
parenthood into an omnibus category of Motherhood thus carries potentially
queer implications. Is a nurturing father a queer Mother? What kind of
rearrangement of gender does he represent?
In the end, Fineman’s vision of Motherhood is more extensive still. Mother
does not stand only for parenthood as such, subsuming fathers as well as
mothers. It also stands for caretaking more generally, with the Mother–Child
dyad as a metaphor for all relations of dependency among intimates. After
Fineman has de-colonized her, the newly emancipated Mother sets out, it seems,
to lay claim to all kinds of dependency in her name: “Mothering” becomes
shorthand for taking care of “the ill, the elderly, the disabled, as well as actual
children.”30 The Law of the Father is succeeded by the Law of the Mother.
But again, insofar as this Mother is symbolically female, she has the
potential to cause gender trouble. Fineman is openly hostile to social contract
theories of the state.31 While contractarians start from a paranoid conception of
human subjectivity, The Neutered Mother offers a benevolent—we might say
“matriarchal”—conception of state power. The structure of politics need not—
must not—be decreed by a Hobbesian state of nature, with the state standing as
a prison guard making sure that the citizen-inmates do not kill each other, as
26

See id. at 38.
Id. at 235. Or as she states elsewhere: “To be a nurturing father is to concede the importance of
mothering.” Id. at 205.
28
Id. at 234.
29
Id. at 234–35.
30
Id. at 235.
31
See id. at 235–36.
27
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they presumably would unless constantly policed by the institutions of the state.
Instead, she envisions a society founded on taking care of others, rather than a
paranoid logic of self-protection and self-interest.32 Of course, conservatives and
libertarians have a ready-made name for this kind of polity: “nanny state.”33
Although the term is meant as a pejorative, Fineman would no doubt find it
appealing—with the rhetorical caveat that she would likely prefer to call it a
“mommy state,” one that supports all people engaged in Mothering (read: caretaking) activities.
While I am highly suspicious of all gendered norms, I must admit that if it
came to a choice between patriarchy and matriarchy, I would be more than happy
to try out matriarchy for a change. But there is something about Fineman’s vision
that is more complicated than simply a normative switch between male and
female, exchanging patriarchy for matriarchy. Insofar as we understand the state
to be male in its deep structure, turning it into Mother has complex implications.
Ideologically, the nation-state has constituted the dominant political institution
of our times. In the marriage of the nation to the state, the nation—understood
as an essentially cultural, genealogical, and linguistic entity—is represented
stereotypically as female, or Mother. In contrast, the state—viewed as an
essentially political entity—is characterized by male attributes, as Father. From
this perspective, transforming the state from a punishing Father to a nurturing
Mother suggests a rather queer transfiguration. Reanimating the neutered
Mother may not mean simply restoring her to her “original” state, an unqualified
natural motherhood.
There is something of a contradiction, then, in Fineman’s disjunctive
strategies with respect to marriage and motherhood, and the socio-cultural roles
the two prescribe. When it comes to marriage as an institution, she finds it
beyond redemption, with only one legitimate outcome: abolition. While she
finds the discourse of motherhood corrupted as well, she chooses not to abandon
it but to reclaim and reform its compromised terms. Contradictions, of course,
are not objectionable as such. Indeed, as I have suggested, there may be
something queer in this one.
It is notable, as I suggested in the introduction to this Essay, that the
vulnerable subject has lately taken up the central position for Fineman that was
previously occupied by Mother. It does not seem coincidental that insofar as
32

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., DAVID BOAZ, THE POLITICS OF FREEDOM: TAKING ON THE LEFT, THE RIGHT, AND THREATS
TO OUR LIBERTIES ix–xi, xiii, 163–73 (2008) (offering a libertarian critique of both liberal and conservative
politicians for creating a “nanny state” defined by paternalistic governmental policies).
33
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vulnerability theory grows out of disability studies and crip theory, the latter in
turn draw on queer theory, training critical attention on non-normative—indeed,
queer—bodies and the compulsory able-bodiedness demanded by neoliberal
capitalism.34 The vulnerable subject thus seems no less suited to a queer reading
than the figure of Mother in Fineman’s earlier work.

34

See, e.g., ROBERT MCRUER, CRIP THEORY: CULTURAL SIGNS OF QUEERNESS AND DISABILITY (2006).

